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Tajikistan’s Unsettled Security: Borderland 
Dynamics of the Outpost on Russia’s Afghan 
Frontier
Helena Rytövuori-Apunen and Furugzod Usmonov
How does Tajikistan seek to survive as a state as well as benefit from the 
geographic situation in which the uncertainty over the threats and opportuni-
ties offered by “Afghanistan after 2016” relates to the wider region’s future? 
Our question arises from the fact that the state that emerged from a devastat-
ing civil war during 1992–1997 is still very much internally cleaved. We 
seek to answer this by studying the action and policies of the state in relation 
to three problem areas. First, we examine how Tajikistan’s recent internal 
conflicts challenge the state, as represented by its central government and 
regime. Second, we ask how Tajikistan’s relations with Russia evolve against 
the backdrop of threats that are both internal and external; and, third, we dis-
cuss how Tajikistan is utilizing the moment of international cooperation to 
develop energy infrastructure projects aimed at alleviating the security prob-
lem which Afghanistan represents in the region. These three focal points are 
meant to shed light on the practices that connect Tajikistan with an emerging 
configuration of regional security. We begin with a brief description of the 
situation in Tajikistan following the civil war that had left 60,000 dead, 
100,000 missing and created 55,000 orphans. 
The Peace Accords were agreed upon in June 1997, nine months after 
the Taliban had taken power in Kabul, Afghanistan. During the next two 
years, this agreement resulted in the formation of an interim government 
which included the two main parties of the United Tajik Opposition (UTO), 
namely the moderate Islamists (Party of Islamic Renaissance of Tajikistan, 
IRPT) and the Pamir party (Lal’i Badakhshan).1 The core idea of the peace 
deal was the notion that power-sharing would incorporate the opposition into 
the central and local military, police and civil bodies on the basis of a thirty-
percent quota. This was a political compromise meant to disarm and include 
the former guerrilla groups in a country-wide regime system cutting through 
all administrative levels and setting up the basis for the common state. The 
                                                          
1 The third party was the small Democratic Party of Tajikistan.
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more extreme political Islamist groups fled to Afghanistan and, later, to Paki-
stan; and the militant anti-Islamists again escaped to Uzbekistan.2 The peace 
deal, which had been brokered by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 
cooperation with the UN, thus remained under pressure from both sides from 
across the borders. The following decades did not consolidate the formula 
meant to establish legitimacy for a national state. In late August 2015, an 
order by the Ministry of Justice banned the IRPT, which since 1999 had been 
the only officially registered Islamic party in Central Asia and which had 
been poised to win the position of the second largest party in the country in 
the spring 2015 parliamentary elections. One month later, Tajikistan’s Su-
preme Court declared the party to be an extremist and a terrorist organiza-
tion.3 The peace deal, which over many years was seen to set an example for 
Afghanistan, had ultimately failed, and the secular regime that had estab-
lished its power already during the civil war with Russia’s support prevailed 
alone in an increasingly polarizing country. 
The political polarization which sets the supporters of a secular regime 
against various pro-Islamic forces intertwines with the dividing lines between 
regions where, during the civil war, armed groups fought for either the con-
trol of central power in Dushanbe or for greater autonomy from it. In the civ-
il war the north led by factions from Leninabad (today’s Khujand), which 
were competing yet also allied with eastern Khatlon (led by factions from 
Kulyab), fought against the Islamists with strongholds in Rasht in central 
Tajikistan, Gorno-Badakhshan in the south-east and Qurghonteppa (western 
Khatlon) in the south. Simultaneously Gorno-Badakhshan, which had been 
an Autonomous Oblast’ (termed GBAO) in Soviet-era Tajikistan, fought for 
                                                          
2 John Heathershaw and Edmund Herzig, “Introduction: The Sources of Statehood in Tajiki-
stan,” Central Asian Survey 30, no. 1 (April 2011): 5–19; see also Mohammad-Reza Djalili, 
Frédéric Grare, and Shirin Akiner, eds., Tajikistan: The Trials of Independence (New York: 
Routledge, 1998).
3 The ban on the Islamist party was introduced in 1993 and lifted again in 1999.  In the 
March 2015 parliamentary elections, the Islamic Renaissance Party failed to pass the 5 per-
cent vote barrier. Partial results had predicted that the party would win 7.7 percent of the 
votes, which would have made it the second-largest party. OSCE observers reported that the
elections did not meet democratic standards. Qishloq Ovozi, “A Pyrrhic Victory In Tajik 
Parliamentary Elections,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, March 5, 2015,
http://www.rferl.org/content/tajikistan-islam-elections-parliament-history/26883637.html.
For official information on the outlawing of the IRPT, see “Islamic Renaissance Party of 
Tajikistan is declared extremist terrorist organization, and its activities are prohibited,” 
Khovar, September 30, 2015, http://www.khovar.tj/eng/content/islamic-renaissance-party-
tajikistan-declared-extremist-terrorist-organization-and-its.
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more self-determination. A further feature of the anatomy of the initially 
fractured Tajikistani geobody is that its borders are not congruent with the 
idea of a bounded geographic identity. Like elsewhere in post-Soviet Central 
Asia, the borders of the state are fused with ethnic connections intertwined 
with family networks and economic activity. In terms of population, the 
greatest fusion is with Afghanistan: the Panj River leaves more ethnic Tajiks 
on the Afghan side (7–8 million in the north-eastern regions) than within the 
Republic of Tajikistan (80 percent of a total population of 7.5 million).4 Even 
though Afghan and Tajik people have been separated since 1895, when the 
borderline was demarcated on the basis of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 
1872, Tajiks living on either side of the Panj River have maintained a bond 
of kinship and “brotherhood.” During the years of heavy fighting in the civil 
war (1992–1995), groups from Afghanistan supported the Tajik Islamic op-
position, and Tajikistan’s territory provided shelter for the Northern Alliance 
fighting against the Taliban between 1996 and 2001. Following this Tajiki-
stan became a part of the logistics network set up in the region for the ISAF, 
and the Dushanbe airport was used by mainly the French military contingent. 
Simultaneously the state border with Afghanistan is Tajikistan’s only 
border lacking controversy over the allocation of territory. The border be-
tween Tajikistan and Uzbekistan is still largely mined and reveals the deep 
hostilities that surfaced after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The border 
to Kyrgyzstan is fraught with inter-communal conflict that is intertwined 
with land issues; and pressure from the Chinese government to buy land from 
eastern Tajikistan has proved too great for Dushanbe to resist. However, 
even if the relations between Dushanbe and Kabul are unproblematic in 
comparison with these other neighbors (and a possible return to power by the 
Taliban in Kabul is unlikely to change the situation much), the threat that 
developments in Afghanistan will pull Tajikistan deep into conflict is real 
because instability in Afghanistan reinforces the tensions that in Tajikistan 
have remained below the surface of the unifying projects of the state after 
1997. In recent years (that is, during a time which coincides with the prepara-
tion of the withdrawal of the U.S. and NATO-led troops from Afghanistan), 
                                                          
4 Afghanistan’s population of 30 million (in 2012) is 42 percent Pashtun, 27 percent Tajik, 9 
percent Hazara, 9 percent Uzbek, 4 percent Aimak, 3 percent Turkmen, 2 percent Baloch; 
the remaining 4 percent are made up of smaller groups. “Tajiks” in Tajikistan includes Pa-
miri-language speakers; in the USSR before 1937 such speakers had been registered as na-
tionalities separate from Tajiks.
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Tajikistan has experienced several incidents of violent insurgency which, 
even when occurring deep within Tajikistani territory, have arisen through 
transborder connections and caused tension with neighboring states. All this 
means that the government in Tajikistan is already greatly burdened with 
problems resulting from fragmented power even while being expected by the 
international community to show that the Tajikistani state is “fit” to ward off 
security threats seen to be shared by other regional states and external pow-
ers. 
The border to Afghanistan is heavily defended through the security guar-
antees given by Russia and the CSTO, and also the U.S. and China provide 
technical and material support in strengthening this border. The paradox of 
this international security cooperation and assistance is that whilst it 
strengthens external defense it also risks contributing to the increase of inter-
nal tensions in an already divided country. International cooperation for the 
security of borders is an authoritative statement about the existence of threats 
and can be used to support the legitimacy of measures that risk reproducing 
the conflicts left by the civil war inside the country. This situation is illustrat-
ed by the fact that the dissolution of the IRPT in early September 2015 coin-
cided with armed attacks in the capital and in its vicinity, leaving at least 45 
people (including 13 soldiers) dead, many wounded and some 139 detained 
in an anti-terrorist operation. General Abdukhalim Nazarzoda, a former 
deputy defense minister, and a group of his supporters were killed in an 
armed operation carried out by units of the Ministry of the Interior in the 
Romit Gorge some 150 kilometers from Dushanbe. This took place a few 
days after the occurrence of violent incidents that included weapons seizure 
and attacks on the police; the group was accused for planning a coup in favor 
of Islamic political forces within the country and charged with treason and 
terrorism. General Nazarzoda was one of the former UTO leaders who had 
been incorporated into the fragile power-sharing system but who ultimately 
came to symbolize its failure due to internal rivalries and power struggles. 
Russian commentary marginalized the significance of the events and Russian 
authorities reconfirmed their support for Tajikistan.5 In the same month the 
CSTO held its summit in Dushanbe and Tajikistan hosted the Exercise Re-
gional Cooperation 2015 organized by the U.S. Central Command, and the 
                                                          
5 “Armed clashes in Tajikistan entail no destabilization in that country—CSTO Chief,” 
TASS, September 18, 2015, http://tass.ru/en/world/822247. 
135
U.S. also announced a delivery of tactical equipment to Tajikistan’s police. 
These were scheduled events, yet the temporal connection made them into 
signs of support for the regime.6
In the section that follows we examine how Tajikistan’s initially fragile 
and forcibly welded political “geobody” takes shape in the signification of 
the “frontier land” through the government’s responses, both verbal and ki-
netic, to three outbursts of violence which have created security alerts in Ta-
jikistan during the 2010s: the Rasht events of 2010; the violence in Khorog 
in 2012; and the long-enduring conflict complex in Ferghana which, in 2014, 
attracted attention within the CSTO because it had started to impact state 
relations between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. The three series of events all 
connect with different regions and border dynamics in Tajikistan. We then 
proceed to examine the role that Russia is taking as the guarantor of security 
in Tajikistan and the policies through which Tajikistan is striving to expand 
its space for deliberation and bargaining in determining their common inter-
est. As an external border of the CSTO, Tajikistan’s border with Afghanistan 
is a “common border.”7 Tajikistan hosts Russia’s largest ground-force base
beyond Russia’s own borders and is firmly aligned with Russia. The 201st
Russian Military Base (formerly Soviet 201st Motorized Rifle Division) near 
Dushanbe, with branches in Qurghonteppa and Kulyab in the south and with 
some 7,500 military troops (and announced plans to increase the number to 
9,000), is emphasized in Moscow to be Russia’s “outpost” on the southern 
CIS borders.8 Following an examination of these issues, we discuss how the 
Tajikistani leadership seeks to benefit from the increased international inter-
est that has propelled the states in Central Asia to the center of international 
efforts to foster economic and social development in and around Afghani-
                                                          
6 “Exercise Regional Cooperation has Nothing to do with Recent Security Operation Con-
ducted in Tajikista [sic],” ASIA-Plus, Dushanbe, September 23, 2015, http://news.tj/en/
news/exercise-regional-cooperation-has-nothing-do-recent-security-operation-conducted-
tajikista.
7 Embassy of the Russian Federation in the Republic of Tajikistan, “Interv’iu Posla Rossii v 
Tadzhikistane I.S. Liakina-Frolova ‘Narodnoi gazete’,” accessed October 12, 2015, 
http://www.rusemb.tj/ru/index/index/pageId/535; “Prognozy po Afganistanu vse bolee 
pessimistichny,” (Interview of Ambassador I.S. Liakin-Frolov), Kommersant, December 10, 
2013, http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2364685.
8 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, “Interv’iu stats-sekretaria –
zamestitelia Ministra inostrannykh del Rossii G.B. Karasina gazete ‘Kommersant’, 10 Sen-
tiabria 2013 goda,” September 10, 2013, 
http://www.mid.ru/BDOMP/Brp_4.nsf/arh/0E159670A3714F2344257BE200225B0B?Ope
nDocument.
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stan. We conclude with a summary of the patterns of policies which shape 
Tajikistan in its uncertain situation.
Tajikistan’s “Problematic Regions”: Recent Violent 
Encounters and Security Alerts
Rasht, August–September 2010
On August 23, 2010, a group of twenty-five prisoners in Jail No. 1 of Du-
shanbe City escaped from the prison, killing several security guards, and 
scattering throughout the country. The escapees included not only criminals 
but also political prisoners. The Tajik government sent troops under the Min-
istry of Defense to search for the fugitives in all the regions of the country. 
On September 19, 2010, the motorcade of the Ministry of Defense, which 
had been sent to the Rasht region to locate fugitives, was attacked by an 
armed group. According to official data, 28 people died in a shootout; the 
number given by non-official sources was about 40. The Islamic Movement 
of Uzbekistan (IMU) claimed responsibility for the attack. In a video the 
IMU announced its demand that the government was to abandon its current 
domestic and foreign policies.9 The IMU has systematically organized armed 
attacks aimed at establishing the rule of an Islamic state in Central Asia. Ac-
cording to the government’s version of events, the aim of the attack was to 
impede the law enforcement agencies from performing the tasks by which 
they represent the authority of the present regime and to gain control over the 
eastern part of Tajikistan.
The Tajik government announced that the leaders of the group behind 
the armed attack in Rasht were well-known Tajik warlords from the civil 
war—Mullo Abdullo (Abdullo Rahimov), Ali Bedaki (Alovuddin Davlatov) 
and Mirzokhuja Akhmadov. According to official sources, this group was 
attacking motorcades with the support of international terrorist networks. 
Several dead bodies of ethnically non-Tajik insurgents were brought forward
as evidence. The Tajik government reacted “symmetrically”—with a deter-
mined use of military force—to what it unequivocally described as a terrorist 
                                                          
9 Maksim Kulinov, “Ubiitsy tadzhikskikh voennykh obeshchaiut novye terakty,” Segodnia,
September 24, 2010, http://www.segodnia.ru/content/13998.
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attack. In January 2011 government sources released the news that Ali Be-
daki had been killed during military action. However, at the same time a vid-
eo was posted on the internet that showed the detained Ali Bedaki being in-
terrogated by government authorities. A short while later the government 
made an official announcement that the detainee in the video was not the real 
Ali Bedaki. Further, Tajikistan’s most infamous terrorist, Mullo Abdullo, 
was killed during a military operation in Rasht in April 2011. This field 
commander in the civil war, who had rejected the 1997 Peace Accords and 
remained mainly on the Afghan side of the border ever since then, was ru-
mored to have been establishing a terrorist camp in Rasht. Only Mirzohuja 
Akhmadov was granted amnesty during the military action for his loyalty and 
support of the government troops. 
From the very beginning of the civil war onward the Rasht region had 
been the cradle of Tajikistan’s Islamic opposition. By its heavy-handed mili-
tary response to the attack in the gorge the Tajik government demonstrated 
that it had complete control over the country’s territory. The result of these 
actions was the establishment of a power vertical which subordinated the 
Rasht region to Dushanbe’s control. Through its response the government 
also made clear its uncompromising attitude towards anybody wishing to 
mobilize political forces for regime change. This message was sent not only 
to the local inhabitants; the Tajik authorities repeatedly made statements that 
they were aware of who had been supporting Tajikistan’s domestic terrorists. 
This reference to outside forces was easily deciphered due to the fact that the 
Tajik radical Islamic opposition from Rasht had the reputation of being deep-
ly connected with militant insurgent networks such as the IMU and the Tali-
ban. The group attacking the motorcade was reported to be a combination of 
Tajik, Uzbek, Afghan and Arab radical Islamists. Following the govern-
ment’s military action in Rasht, region-wide insurgent organizations lost one 
of their strongholds in Central Asia. In addition to this, the Dushanbe gov-
ernment had now also accomplished the elimination of various key figures of 
the militant opposition of the civil war era. Since the civil war, Tajikistan has 
lived with the shadowy figures of the former “warlords.” Some of these have 
physically returned to Tajikistan, whilst some repeatedly return to people’s 
minds; yet already the rumors and stories of these nebulous figures of the 
former warlords of the civil war have had a mobilizing—and dividing—
effect on the population, especially in rural areas.
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It is reasonable to assume that the insurgents did indeed have connec-
tions with the Taliban and the IMU; the latter of these had already shown its 
presence in Afghanistan a decade earlier and were known to operate from the 
border zone between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Whether it was the IMU that 
was actually behind the attack is a different question; yet to assume this is to 
legitimize the use of force in the state’s response. Credibility is stretched 
when the logical truth that an ethnic Uzbek or Afghan is not Tajik is suggest-
ed to further demonstrate that there are “foreigners” inside Tajikistan’s bor-
ders who are participating in terrorist activities. The information that is avail-
able does not reveal from which side of the legal state border the non-Tajik 
insurgents came. Such facts are difficult to establish in a multi-ethnic region 
where family bonds extend beyond borders, and it is hardly credible that the 
official information on the origin of the insurgents could be based on identity 
papers carried by the insurgents. Interpretations driven by ideas and conven-
tional concepts (the state confined by its borders, nationals vs. non-nationals) 
are useful in broadening the frame of legitimate action and make it possible 
to perform legal action in terms of one law rather than another. Although the 
evidence is not clear in multiethnic Tajikistan, where Uzbek and Afghan eth-
nic faces are encountered every day, the features argued to demonstrate the 
presence of “foreign” elements make it possible to frame the events as terror-
ism steered from abroad. Such interpretations also contribute to an ethno-
nationalist project of state-building by constructing a distinctly “national” 
project of security. 
Another question crucial for the meaning of the event is whether the mil-
itant insurgents included ethnic Arabs and whether the event, on this basis, 
can be called “international terrorism” in a wider sense rather than merely 
regional connections? The evidence provided by official information sources 
consisted in photographs of bodies, which are data easily manipulated by 
modern techniques. Again, we cannot know how facts were used to support 
the argument by which the global war on terror is used to legitimize action 
eliminating figures (both corporeal and mythical) that have remained from 
the civil war and that are perceived as acute threats today. The horizon of 
interpretation we need to introduce in order to make sense of the events and 
the government’s responses that they elicit hinges on the specific future envi-
sioned by decision-makers in Dushanbe. It was important for the government 
to gain control of the Rasht region before it could become a node in interna-
tional militant insurgent networks. This is a real threat if and when the Tali-
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ban intensify their fight, even if their own goals remain focused on Afghani-
stan. In the stress moment over the uncertainty of the future of Afghanistan, 
the government in Dushanbe is under pressure to show that it is capable of 
controlling its own territory and of fulfilling the tasks expected of an inde-
pendent state. 
The Pamir, July 2012
In 2011 Tajikistan’s parliament acquiesced to China’s territorial claims and 
allowed 5.5 percent of Tajikistani territory in the mountainous Gorno-
Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast’ to be ceded to China. The fact that this 
raised civil protests nowhere else other than in this region itself tells about 
the political isolation of this ethnically non-Tajik part of Tajikistan from the 
rest of the country. While Dushanbe was content in having been able to re-
duce China’s demands by fifty percent, within GBAO the deal re-awakened 
civil war-era arguments about the need for the devolution of the central 
state.10 The Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region (Pamir) has never been 
effectively included into the judicial system of the republic since Tajikistan
became independent. The institutions representing the central power—the 
Court of the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region of the Republic of Ta-
jikistan and the Prosecutor’s Office of the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous 
Region of the Republic of Tajikistan—have little legitimacy in the eyes of 
the local people and it is local leaders who hold authority in judicial matters. 
During the Soviet decades this ethnically and geographically distinct region 
was an external border of the USSR directly linked to Moscow as a special 
military district which residents from elsewhere in Tajikistan could not enter 
without a special permit. But although the entire GBAO was a border region 
towards China, the far-western parts of China were still habitually closer to 
the population along the ethnically mixed border than were Dushanbe, Tash-
kent or Moscow; these capitals were distant not only logistically and geo-
graphically but also because of Soviet state practices.11
                                                          
10 “Tajikistan cedes land to China,” BBC, January 13, 2011,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-12180567.
11 Steven Parham, “‘Rightful’ versus ‘Real’ Homelands: Changing Concepts of Kyrgyz 
Boundaries and Belonging on the China-Kyrgyzstan Frontier,” Asian Ethnicity 15, no. 3 
(July 2014): 265–85.
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In July 2012 conflict culminated in a violent encounter between govern-
ment troops and local inhabitants and resulted in a large number of casual-
ties. This was preceded by a series of incidents, among them occasions on 
which prosecutors and other representatives of the republic’s juridical system 
as well as members of the police staff had been physically abused by local 
leaders. The murder of General Abdullo Nazarov, the head of the Pamiri 
branch of the Committee of National Security, on July 21, 2012, in the vi-
cinity of Khorog was the event which triggered Dushanbe’s response. The 
official authorities announced that the General had been killed by order of 
Tolibek Ayombekov, a local criminal leader accused of drug trafficking and 
the smuggling of tobacco and gemstones. Ayombekov had a background of 
being a “warlord” in the civil war and, until recently, he was deputy chief of 
the border unit in the Ishkashim district.12 His person illustrates how, at the 
conclusion of the civil war, the militia of the opposition forces laid down 
their arms and became a part of the state, contesting “their share of the rents 
of statehood.”13
When the events in Khorog were officially reported, their course at first 
seemed relatively clear: the central government had shown its determination 
to punish the General’s murderers. The population of Khorog, the region and 
the entire country could sigh in relief because the government troops and the 
armed Pamir groups had agreed on a truce and thereby suspended the mili-
tary operation with its use of air, artillery and special units of the Ministry of 
Interior Affairs and the Committee of National Security. Imam Aga Khan 
had once again demonstrated his skill at successfully concluding a peace-
making mission: Ayombekov, who initially argued that the operation was a 
pretext for increasing the grip of central power over the region, himself em-
phasized that his group surrendered their weapons because Imam Aga Khan 
had asked them to do so and to cease fighting against the government.14
However, the situation at the conclusion of the military action was far more 
contradictory. 
The government of Tajikistan had sent around 800 troops (or more than 
1000, according to some media sources) to Khorog, where they were faced 
                                                          
12 Statement of the General Prosecutor’s office of the Republic of Tajikistan, “Za chto ubili 
generala Nazarova?,” Avesta.tj, July 28, 2012, http://www.avesta.tj/goverment/13360-za-
chto-ubili-generala-nazarova.html.
13 Jesse Driscoll quoted in Heathershaw and Herzig, “The Sources of Statehood,” 11.
14 “Interv’iu Toliba Aiombekova pered sdachei,” InoZpress Press Digest (source: Radio Svo-
boda), August 15, 2012, http://inozpress.kg/news/view/id/36829.
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with fierce armed resistance by a group of local leaders whom the govern-
ment termed “militants.” The active stage of the military action took place on 
July 24, 2012. According to official data, 30 people from a militant criminal 
group and 12 members of the law enforcement bodies of the Republic of Ta-
jikistan died while a further 23 people were injured. According to a number 
of other (including Russian) media sources about 200 people died, more than 
half of whom were unarmed, ordinary citizens.15 As opposed to the Rasht 
events, in which the majority of the population supported the government 
and were able to accept the harsh military measures, the events in the Pamirs 
divided public opinion throughout the country. In Rasht militant insurgents, 
allegedly affiliated with radical international jihadist groups, had fought 
against the secular regime. In Khorog, the opposition consisted of local in-
habitants, both unarmed people and armed groups, and their action was 
aimed at increasing the autonomy of regional policies and businesses. The 
government defined the events in Rasht as a terrorist attack, whereas the re-
sponse to the situation in the Pamirs was described as a struggle against crim-
inal groups. Bringing the army into the region with armored personnel carri-
ers and helicopters—an operation which necessitated closing the Khorog-
Dushanbe highway and switching off internet servers—made the action ap-
pear as a massive demonstration of the state’s power in the classical sense of 
its monopoly over the means of violence. Whether this showing of the pres-
ence of the state’s power was intended to deter the pursuit of regional auton-
omy from governance structures or whether it was designed to crush illegal 
local enterprise is difficult to ascertain; in all likelihood, both reasons pertain.
The Pamiri population took an active part in the information war against 
the government’s military action. Local residents had access to the mass me-
dia and international organizations, and they were able to organize a popular 
campaign against the government’s military action through their social net-
works. The demonstrations organized by the Pamiri people near Tajik em-
bassies in various countries showed that the government’s regular measure—
to close down Tajik and Russian internet providers—was not effective due to 
the wider international connections of the Pamir population. Pamiri repre-
sentatives evaluated the government’s actions as an ethnicity-based repres-
                                                          
15 “Okolo 200 chelovek pogibli v khode spetsoperatsii v Tadzhikistane - SMI,” RIA Novosti,
July 24, 2012, http://ria.ru/world/20120724/708131588.html. 
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sion of Badakhshan’s inhabitants.16 Both internal and international pressure 
forced the Tajik government to start negotiating an agreement with local 
leaders. While the government’s measures in Rasht were able to benefit from 
the international condemnation of terrorism, in Khorog international opinion 
constrained action. The Tajik government also needed to take into account 
that a prolonged conflict would affect the economic situation. The Pamir re-
gion is one of the main gateways for the transit of goods between Tajikistan 
and China even if in recent years it has been losing its pre-eminence to the 
more accessible routes through southern Kyrgyzstan.  
Very little was achieved from the government’s point of view. The con-
flict was merely brought to a standstill but, unlike in Rasht, the central gov-
ernment did not continue its efforts to establish full authority over the Pamir 
territory. The majority of local leaders who had participated in the violent 
outburst remained free. No guarantees were established to prevent the con-
flict from reigniting, and armed clashes relating to protests prompted by the 
detention of locals again flared up in December, 2013 as well as in May, 
2014. In summer 2012 the need to maintain a peaceful political climate be-
fore the upcoming presidential elections of November 2013 (in which the 
incumbent president was re-elected) was one of the reasons requiring the 
cessation of the conflict before it threatened to proliferate. The decision-
makers in Dushanbe also had to consider the sensitivity of the political situa-
tion in Badakhshan, where local leaders have close connections with Afghan 
Badakhshani across the border; the latter would likely support their “broth-
ers” were a conflict to flare up between the Pamir region and Tajikistan’s 
central government. In light of the draw-down of the U.S. troops from Af-
ghanistan, such cross-border bonds are likely to be further strengthened. 
There were also rumors—reinforced from government-related sources one 
year later, in July 2013—that a new country, “Greater Badakhshan” (which 
would combine the two regions straddling the border) is being supported by 
countries external to the region.17 If “Greater Badakhshan” was in fact be-
lieved to be on the “New Great Game” chessboard in order to better control 
Afghanistan after the Western military withdraws, Dushanbe’s show of force 
                                                          
16 In Tajikistani state practices, the Pamiri are not considered as a separate ethnic group but 
instead as a sub-group of the Tajik people who speak a different dialect and adhere to the 
Ismaili branch of Islam.
17 “Russia and China will help prevent creation of ‘Great [sic] Badakhshan,’ says Tajik Ex-
pert,” ASIA-Plus, July 12, 2013, http://news.tj/en/news/russia-and-china-will-help-prevent-
creation-great-badakhshan-says-tajik-expert.
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was also a message sent to the alleged plotters. However, for the domestic 
audience the lack of transparency about the purpose and the goals of the op-
eration were striking. All the same it became clear that while the uncertainty 
over the developments in Afghanistan was an important reason for the Tajik-
istani government to implement its measures in Rasht, in Khorog and the 
Pamir region a massive use of force would generate a backlash and, ultimate-
ly, prove to be counterproductive. Alongside these local and regional dynam-
ics, a more general, country-wide political polarization also impacts the re-
gion. The region is not spared from the crackdown on Islamist politicians that
is taking place throughout the country and which affects not only radical 
wings but also the more moderate Islam of the IRPT, that is, of the political 
force which, at the conclusion of the civil war, was meant to prevent political 
polarization. Because the international war on terrorism has made it com-
monly acceptable to claim that phenomena described as political and reli-
gious “extremism” predict terrorist acts and, consequently, in legal codes and 
in other policies and action can be legitimately brought under the concept of 
the “threat of terrorism,” violent acts or their preparation are not needed as 
evidence of the threat situations which can legally invoke the government’s 
response, including the use of armed security units. The alleged enemy is not 
limited to the militant insurgency which challenges the state’s authority but 
also includes the rather more diffuse ideological enemies, in which case the 
evidence of subversive activity can be as arbitrary as the existence of family 
relations and religious habits. This practice of political polarization, which 
has been present and on the increase ever since the first years following the 
implementation of the peace settlement, diminishes the space for a middle 
ground in politics and, in this way, strengthens authoritarianism. The uncer-
tainty over Afghanistan has become a further push towards such develop-
ment. 
Russia did not directly involve itself in the conflict events in Rasht and 
the Pamirs but it did support Tajikistan’s authorities through the regional 
institutions within the frame of the CIS and, especially, by providing military 
and technical assistance and training for the Tajik enforcement bodies 
through the CSTO. The Russian president and foreign ministry, like also the 
state leaders in Tajikistan’s Central Asian neighbors, expressed their concern 
over the need to restore stability and public order in the problem regions yet 
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refrained from any active involvement in the conflicts.18 Only the president 
of Belarus, Alexandr Lukashenko, presented a demand that the CSTO should 
react to the events in the Pamirs in order not to undermine its own goals as a 
serious organization. In his response to this demand, Nikolai Bordiuzha, the 
general secretary of the CSTO, underlined that the situation in Tajikistan was 
that country’s internal affair and that its authorities were capable of solving 
the difficulties in question on their own. Lukashenko’s intervention, just like 
Bordiuzha’s more technically worded emphasis on the need to “monitor” the 
situation, shows that the CSTO continues to closely observe the situation in 
Tajikistan and that there are pressures to develop support which would de-
crease the need to become directly involved in a member state’s internal con-
flicts.19 In the Moscow media a few months later, Bordiuzha assured that the 
use of servicemen at the Russian base in Tajikistan in conflicts such as those 
in Khorog was categorically “ruled out” because the bilateral agreements 
between the two countries dealt with Russia’s assistance only in relation to 
external threats.20 Because non-interference applies to “internal” conflicts, it 
is also in Russia’s interest that these conflicts can be internally contained and 
that its support, which continues to cleave the political landscape in the coun-
try, remains in the background. 
Sugd, Spring 2014
The third region in which recent violent outbursts with cross-border implica-
tions have taken place is Sugd, Tajikistan’s part of the Ferghana Valley. Ever 
since the final years of the Soviet Union, the Ferghana Valley has been a 
high-risk area for violent social and interethnic conflict. Violent outbursts in 
recent years have arisen mostly from conflicts over development resources—
in particular over land, water and road construction. Because the valley is 
today a habitual space divided between three states (Tajikistan, Uzbekistan 
                                                          
18 “IDUt k ‘OKNU’?,” Novaia Gazeta, October 21, 2010, http://www.novgaz.com/index.php/
2-news/529---‘.’
19 Anna Analbaeva, “Pora vmeshat’sia,” Vzgliad, July 31, 2012,
http://www.vz.ru/politics/2012/7/31/591112.html.
20 “Russian troops will not be used for suppressing protests in Tajikistan, says CSTO Secre-
tary General,” ASIA-Plus, November 21, 2012 (the article makes reference to RIA Novosti
and Bordiuzha’s interview in Moscow News),
http://news.tj/en/news/russian-troops-will-not-be-used-suppressing-protests-tajikistan-says-
csto-secretary-general.
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and Kyrgyzstan), the eruption of violence in one part of the region affects 
another part and, like this, becomes an issue which involves the territories of 
various states. The large number of enclaves and the absence of delimited 
and demarcated borders increase the complexity of communal and ethnic 
relations. The fertile valley, where land is scarce due to dense population and 
where one ethnic group so often lives surrounded by another, is commonly 
perceived as an ethno-political powder-keg. Tensions escalate when violent 
incidents in one country not only draw attention in the neighboring country 
but also prompt it to mobilize its security forces to prevent the disorder from 
spreading, thereby unleashing mutual accusations over the operation of for-
eign agencies and terrorist groups in their respective territories. The role of 
the Ferghana Valley as one of the main routes (“the North corridor”) for nar-
cotics from Afghanistan and its reputation, brought about in the late 1990s, 
for being a “hub” of Islamic activities, increase the complexity of conflict at 
the inter-state level.
Ethnically polarized conflicts between the Kyrgyz, Tajik and Uzbek 
populations have occurred frequently over the past three years in the Kyrgyz-
stani Batken and Osh regions.21 On January 11, 2014, a border skirmish over
road construction resulted in violent conflict that included hostage-taking 
amongst the Tajik and Kyrgyz populations in the enclaves in the undemar-
cated border zone between the two countries.22 During May 7–8, about 60 
people on both sides were reported to have been injured in interethnic clashes
which resulted in the blockage of the Isfara-Vorukh road by the Kyrgyz and 
the Batken-Isfara road by the Tajiks; the former road runs through a Kyrgyz 
village, and the latter through a Tajik village. Because these territories are 
deeply intertwined violence has erupted on the Kyrgyz as well as the Tajik 
(and Uzbek) sides, even if media attention has focused on Kyrgyzstan in par-
ticular.23 The neighboring states have complained that Kyrgyzstan’s social 
                                                          
21 “Vorukh vyshel iz blokady,” Radio Ozodi, April 28, 2013,
http://rus.ozodi.org/content/tensions-in-vorukh-ended/24970574.html; Malika Sharif, 
“Kak izmenilis’ otnosheniia mezhdu kirgizami i uzbekami posle konflikta,” Deutsche Welle 
online, July 22, 2010, http://dw.com/p/ORdt.
22 “Na kirgizsko-tadzhikskoi granitse proizoshla perestrelka mezhdu pogranichnikami, est’ 
ranenye,” REGNUM, January 11, 2014, http://www.regnum.ru/news/17533343.
html#ixzz2s4fyQ1Ta.
23 “Rasstrel demonstrantov v Andizhane – prestuplenie, ne imeiushchee istoricheskoi davnos-
ti,” Jarayon.com, May 23, 2015, http://jarayon.com/ru/index.php/2012-04-03-17-13-06/
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and ethnic tensions and political conflict, as well as Bishkek’s changing re-
gimes, have resulted in the inability of the country’s central authorities to 
properly govern the difficult territory in the south of Kyrgyzstan. Kyrgyz-
stan, for its part, has blamed local Tajiks for “hooliganism,” and initiatives 
were formulated that ranged from closing the border crossing points to in-
creasing the fees for transit, although these were only partly implemented. 
Alexander Knyazev, a Russian analyst, expressed the opinion that “the Kyr-
gyz officials are looking for an external enemy to mobilize the population; 
and Tajikistan, in comparison with Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, with which 
the Kyrgyz Republic also has border tensions, is the least dangerous coun-
try.”24 Both countries started constructing longer road routes that bypass the 
villages populated by the titular ethnic group of the neighboring country.  
However, the fact that closing the border would have negative conse-
quences for the economies of both countries ultimately pushed the two gov-
ernments to try to resolve the conflict by diplomatic means. Tajikistan and 
Kyrgyzstan have had a joint border commission since 2002 and have been 
able to define 50–60 percent of their almost one-thousand kilometer-long 
mutual borderline. Although the CSTO, of which both countries are mem-
bers, refrained from openly intervening in the conflicts that erupted in spring 
2014, its assistance was clear from the results of the visit of the organiza-
tion’s Secretary General, Nikolai Bordiuzha, to Dushanbe and Bishkek in 
February 2014: after this meeting Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan continued their 
negotiations without further outbursts of violence.25 Earlier, in late spring 
2010, the social upheaval and interethnic violence between Uzbek and Kyr-
gyz populations in south-western Kyrgyzstan and the city of Osh had demon-
strated how such conflicts could create dissent within the organization and 
negatively affect its reputation. In spring 2015, at a time when Tajikistan and 
                                                                                                                            
item/347-rasstrel-demonstrantov-v-andizhane-prestuplenie-ne-imeyushchee-istoricheskoj-
davnosti; “Tadzhiksko-kirgizskii konflikt: Dolgoe molchanie Tadzhikistana bylo obosno-
vano,” Pressa.tj, January 16, 2015, http://rus.pressa.tj/news/tadzhiksko-kirgizskiy-
konflikt-dolgoe-molchanie-tadzhikistana-bylo-obosnovano.
24 Alexander Knyazev interviewed in Viktoriia Panfilova, “Kirgizy s tadzhikami deliat nebo,” 
Nezavisimaia Gazeta, January 29, 2014, http://www.ng.ru/cis/2014-01-29/7_kirgizia.html.
25 “ODKB sledit za protsessom uregulirovaniia pogranichnogo konflikta i predlagaet kon-
sul’tativnuiu pomoshch’,” KGinform, January 16, 2014, as cited in CSTO “Informatsionnyi 
Biulleten’ Sekretariata ODKB,” January 17, 2014,
http://www.odkb-csto.org/obzor-pressy/detail.php?ELEMENT_ID=3162;
Denis Kozhemiakin, “Bordiuzha kak bordiur mezhdu kirgizami i tadzhikami,” Soiuz 
nezavisimykh zhurnalistov Tsentral’noi Azii, February 15, 2014,
http://ca-snj.com/bordyuzha-kak-bordyur-mezhdu-kirgizami-i-tadzhikami. 
147
Kyrgyzstan were already in diplomatic negotiations to solve the problems of 
communal violence in Ferghana, they also confirmed their willingness to 
cooperate in their search for solutions to these conflicts within the frame of 
the CIS. 
Both the tightened security situation in the region as well as the benefits 
that are expected to accrue from mutual economic cooperation have brought 
Dushanbe and Bishkek together in trying to find solutions to communal vio-
lence in the Ferghana Valley. However, without Uzbekistan’s participation 
the bilateral efforts to control the flow of drugs and militant insurgency can-
not be effective.26 In the Alay mountain ranges the borders of the three states 
converge in rough terrain that shelters illegal trade routes as well as insurgent 
groups linked with IMU and Hizb ut-Tahrir. If the routes in Ferghana were 
closed they could be redirected through Pamir areas, and new air routes using 
small planes across the largely mined land border of Uzbekistan could also 
be opened. The hostilities between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, which have to 
do with historical conflicts and present-day economic and energy relations, 
have created obstacles to the mutual cooperation of the two countries 
throughout the years of their independence. Tajikistan’s tightened policies 
towards the political forces of Islam have an appeasing effect on relations 
with Uzbekistan because Dushanbe’s moderate policies were not initially in 
line with Tashkent’s expectations. Throughout the three countries’ years of 
independence Uzbekistan’s suppression of radical Islam has pushed these 
forces across its borders. More recently this has meant that the IMU has con-
nected with especially the activity of Jamaat Ansarullah (“Allah Associates 
Society”) in the north of Tajikistan—a group that has been vocal in con-
demning the Russian military presence in Tajikistan.27 Closing the front of 
radical Islam in the intersection of the three countries requires Uzbekistan’s 
cooperation; and burying the peace deal by banning the IRPT is conducive 
towards this end.
                                                          
26 The borderline between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan is 1,378 km, of which 337 km have 
been agreed upon (as of June 2014); the rest remains disputed and under negotiation.
27 Igor Rotar, “Moscow and Dushanbe Strengthen Their Military Alliance,” Eurasia Daily 
Monitor 10, no. 184 (October 16, 2013), http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?
tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=41493&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=685&no_cache=1#.VqNj
KY9OJy0.
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Negotiating Frontier Security with Russia
In the military sense Russia’s role in Tajikistan today does not fundamentally 
differ from the role it played there during the civil war when it sent forces to 
secure the Dushanbe airport and the Afghan border, nominally in the CIS 
frame and under the Tashkent treaty (CST). However, while this backing at 
that time was used to weld together a country from the pieces of the former 
Soviet republic, today its military presence provides external backing to the 
burial of the process envisioned in the Peace Accords. From the point of 
view of both Russia and Tajikistan, the dilemma is that while insecurity in 
the wider region seems to necessitate tightening the belt of security vis-a-vis 
not only the Taliban but also the Islamic State (IS) which provides support 
and intermingles with regional insurgency, this belt also threatens to break up 
Tajikistan from the inside and to deepen the conflict north of the Panj and 
Amu Darya rivers.  
Russia’s two-track approach in security cooperation, which includes 
multilateral cooperation in the CSTO and cooperation based on bilateral 
agreements, provides it with a decisive role in most issues while at the same 
time allowing it to use the formal legitimacy of the multilateral frame of co-
operation. Such complementarity is practical in the situation that pertains 
here, where the organization’s collective security (that is, aggression against 
one is considered as aggression against all) applies at the Afghan border, but 
the actual threat from the south as well as from other directions appears in 
other forms. Terrorism, religious extremism and narcotraffic are the actual 
issues on the cooperation agenda between Russia and Tajikistan. On the eve 
of 2015, Russia’s special representative to Afghanistan, Zamir Kabulov, 
warned that up to five thousand “Islamists” were concentrated in northern 
Afghanistan and that at least three camps were each training some fifty mili-
tants every two months with recruits from the Central Asian countries.28
While the Taliban is growing with these non-Pashtun groups, this ebbing 
towards Afghanistan threatens to turn into a returning flood, thereby creating 
a new “Afghan front” for Russia and leading to the crumbling of the outer 
edge of its power that had been set by the Soviet withdrawal in 1989. This 
                                                          
28 “Russian Ambassador Warns of Afghan Problems Spilling across Border,” ASIA-Plus,
Dushanbe, December 30, 2014, http://news.tj/en/news/russian-ambassador-warns-afghan-
problems-spilling-across-border. Kabulov’s original interview was given to Interfax.
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means that Tajikistan’s role is more than one of being merely a control zone 
for violent insurgency and illegal economic transactions: it is also a zone of 
containment for ideological influence. 
Russia has a long historical tradition of flexible outer borders that inter-
twine geopolitics and ideology, and the habitual space shared by Tajiks in-
side Afghanistan has played a significant role in such frontier dynamics in 
Central Asia. Historians have argued that the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic, 
which was established in December 1929 to replace the Tajik ASSR within 
the Uzbek SSR, was actually formed to reflect and politically utilize the 
closely bonded relations between Tajiks on both sides of the bordering riv-
er.29 By providing the Tajik population with the privilege of having their 
own titular republic within the USSR, Moscow’s decision-makers wished to 
attract the “new Afghanistan” and bring it under Soviet influence. Such an 
opportunity existed when, in early 1929, ethnic Tajiks came to power in Af-
ghanistan as a people who represented the lower stratum of Afghan society 
and, thus, were able to share in the ideology of the Soviet state. However, 
events soon took another course: Pashtun tribes and Great Britain supported 
Muhammad Nadir-shah, who captured Kabul in October 1929 and was de-
clared king. 
Another opportunity to connect Afghanistan to the Soviet sphere came 
half a century later, in 1978, with the establishment of the Democratic Re-
public of Afghanistan. A coup known as the Saur Revolution brought to 
power the communist People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan, which, 
however, soon succumbed to ideological strife between its radical and mod-
erate wings. In December 1979 the Soviet Union intervened to support the
moderates led by Babrak Karmal and, much too late in 1986, to launch a pol-
icy of national reconciliation under the leadership of Muhammad Najibullah. 
During the decade-long Soviet quagmire, which ended with the withdrawal 
of Soviet troops in the months from May 1988 to February 1989, ethnic Ta-
jiks acted as advisers and interpreters and in this way played a bridging role 
between Afghan authorities and Soviet power. Because the Russians were 
unable to understand Dari (the variety of the Persian language spoken in Af-
ghanistan), they invited Tajiks to implement Soviet policies.30
                                                          
29 A. D. Bogaturov, Sistemnaia istoriia mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenii, vol. 1 (Moscow: 
Kul’turnaia Revoliutsiia, 2007), 210.
30 The communist leaders were all Pashtun, but in Afghanistan and Tajikistan Babrak Karmal 
was also recognized as a nephew of the ethnic Tajik Habibulloh (Bachai Sako) from his 
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Even after the Soviet troops had pulled back from Afghanistan to the Ta-
jik border in early 1989, and the Panj and Amu Darya rivers had, for the first 
time in their history, become a militarily sealed borderline, Moscow still con-
sidered the northern part of Afghanistan—inhabited as it was by ethnic Ta-
jiks and Uzbeks—very much as its external borderland. There were still 
hopes that northern Afghanistan could be linked with Soviet Central Asia in 
energy networks and other economic cooperation, and that the Hindu Kush 
mountain range in the east could in this way be included in a line of defense 
against the political unrest and clan turmoil to the south. However, the fol-
lowing years made it clear that the line of containment of radical Islam was 
much farther to the north, along the banks of the border river.31 This was a 
line, thin not only in terms of geo-space but also ethnically and politically, as 
well as in terms of the law enforcement structures that could be established in 
order to curtail the trade in opiates and other illegal border crossings. Al-
ready during the final years of the Soviet Union, Tajikistan’s economic situa-
tion had been dire, and its southern regions had been hit by starvation. When 
the civil war brought a further drastic deterioration in social conditions, the 
contraband of opiates and gemstones in the Pamir region became a way of 
survival for large parts of the civilian population. It also became a source of 
income for those militant Islamist groups who had refused to disarm and 
chosen to regain their strength on the other side of the southern border.  
The civil war led to the withdrawal of the radical opposition and militant 
insurgency into the Afghan and Pakistani border zones, and the massive 
ISAF presence held the situation in abeyance. Nevertheless, it was not until 
2005–2006 that the Russian border guards left the border to Afghanistan un-
der Tajikistan’s control. The return of Russian border guards to the Afghan 
border has been on and off the bilateral agenda ever since December 2010, 
when Russia began to apply pressure on Tajikistan over this issue.32 Russia’s 
                                                                                                                            
mother’s side. However, Pashtun was his declared ethnicity and, in practice, formed a con-
dition of becoming a general in Afghanistan.
31 During the 1980s Moscow had sought to initiate national reconciliation in Afghanistan. By 
autumn 1987 it had become clear that this had failed in regions south of the Hindu Kush. 
Joseph Newman, Jr., “The Future of Northern Afghanistan,” Asian Survey 28, no. 7 (July
1988): 729–39.
32 In 2005 Tajikistan decided against continuing the agreement from 1992, which had tasked 
Russian troops with controlling the border. The number of Russian border guards amounted 
to 12,000 (70–80 percent of whom were Tajikistani citizens employed by the Russian bor-
der guard corps). The Russians left in 2005–2006 (after having been there ever since the 
borders of the Uzbek SSR began to be guarded in the 1930s). Some 300 advisers and ex-
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expressed concern was over the massive flow of opiates across the border, 
but Tajikistani authorities were able to deflect this by arguing that this specif-
ic problem could not be solved by increasing manpower at the border.33
Solving this problem, they argued, required international cooperation in sev-
eral multilateral formats, including the CIS and the SCO. At the CSTO meet-
ing in Sochi in September 2013, President Rakhmon (Rakhmonov with the
Slavic names ending used until March 2007) asked for support for the Tajiki-
stani law enforcement bodies in their task of managing the border with Af-
ghanistan, and at the next meeting in Moscow in May 2014, he called to 
mind that the promises of a CSTO resolution on the provision of military 
technology had not been fulfilled. A few weeks later the Council of the 
Heads of State of the CIS reached a decision signed by the CSTO members 
(Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan) on assis-
tance to Tajikistan in regard to the fortification and development of the bor-
der area with Afghanistan; its implementation was left to the bilateral rela-
tions between Tajikistan and the other signatories.34 The smaller members of 
the CSTO have little reason to commit any substantive amounts of their own 
scarce resources but, within Tajikistan, an increase in the number of partners 
clearly serves a policy profile that seeks to show Tajikistan’s independence 
from Russia.
After Tajikistan’s parliament in October 2013 ratified the agreement that 
extends the Russian use of the base in Tajikistan until 2042, a series of bilat-
eral agreements have ensured Russia’s military presence in the country and, 
thus, also the possibility to quickly mobilize troops along the border. Rus-
sia’s direct and permanent presence at the border has little strategic military 
significance in relation to the bilateral cooperation developed inside the 
country for tracking illegal border crossings and setting up the collective air 
force of the CSTO. In December 2014, the leaders of the CSTO member 
                                                                                                                            
perts remained. Their number was later reduced to several tens only. More recently, the 
number has once again been increased and today also the border agency of the CIS member 
states focuses on the Afghan border.
33 See Introduction, note 15 in this book. The drug traffic has increased in recent years despite 
international efforts to curb opiate cultivation in Afghanistan, and the economic situation in 
Afghanistan leaves little economic and political space for the regime in Kabul to curb the 
flow. Sergei Balmasov, “Russian Border Guards to Fight Taliban,” Pravda.ru, December 
17, 2010, http://english.pravda.ru/hotspots/conflicts/17-12-2010/116248-russia
_tajikistan_afghanistan-0/.
34 “CIS to Provide Assistance to Tajikistan in Strengthening of Tajik-Afghan Border Protec-
tion,” AKIpress, Bishkek, June 5, 2014, http://www.akipress.com/news:542655/.
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states agreed upon developing a comprehensive and functionally flexible 
collective air force which includes military transport and special aviation 
units of not only the armed forces but also police forces, interior troops and 
security agencies.35 The collective force remains effectively under Russian 
control, and the disparity of capabilities is especially striking in relation to 
Tajikistan, which possesses but one squadron of small aircraft. 
An episode in this development has been the negotiations between Tajik-
istan and Russia over the use of the Ayni airfield, which is located in the vi-
cinity of Dushanbe and lies just ten minutes away from the Rasht region by 
air, and which was reopened in autumn 2010 after its modernization with 
Indian technical and financial support worth $70 million. The question over 
the use of Ayni had gone unanswered since summer 2007, when Tajikistan 
announced that it was not negotiating over the use of the base with India.36
However, it was not until May 2013 that an announcement was made to the 
effect that the Ayni airfield would be part of Russia’s military base in Tajiki-
stan and, together with the facilities in the south, would be used as the key 
base for the CSTO Collective Rapid Reaction Force.37 Tajikistan used Ayni 
as a bargaining chip in the bundle of issues concerning the financing of the 
Rogun hydropower station and the rents that could be gained from the use of 
the main base as well as Ayni. Although Russia did not signal that it would 
make any promises in regard to financing the Rogun power station, and alt-
hough Russia’s opinion on compensation was that this would come in form 
of modernizing Tajikistan’s security forces, the negotiations over Ayni and 
the delay in the ratification of the agreement on extending the Russian base 
in Tajikistan show Dushanbe’s determination in trying to bargain for re-
sources in exchange for Russia’s military presence. 
                                                          
35 “CSTO Summit Adopts Joint Statement, 19 Resolutions, Two Protocols,” TASS, Moscow,
December 23, 2014, http://tass.ru/en/world/768706.The cooperation in the CIS frame in the 
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High Stakes for Energy Sufficiency and Beyond
The lack of energy is the primary resource problem undermining Tajikistan’s 
eight million inhabitants’ support for the government. Coal-burning during 
cold winters is a health hazard and has even led to deaths, and the repeated 
cut-offs initiated by Uzbekistan in the flow of energy have seriously harmed 
the state-owned Tajikistan Aluminum Company (Talco) which, in Turzunza-
de in the immediate vicinity of the Uzbekistani border, produces more than 
60 percent of Tajikistan’s export revenue.38 As a consequence it is crucially 
important for the Tajikistani government to capture the political moment in 
regard to developing Afghanistan in order to diversify its economic relations 
and to participate in large-scale energy projects that could drastically reduce 
its dependence on Russian investment and energy and, above all, on the en-
ergy resources of neighboring Uzbekistan. Throughout the years of inde-
pendence the conflict-ridden relationship with Uzbekistan—the country 
through which Tajikistan must transit to Russia and Europe—has created 
major obstacles to developing its economic capacities. Air traffic between 
Tashkent and Dushanbe was halted in 1992, and Uzbekistan has on many 
occasions halted trains transporting vital items for Tajikistan’s agriculture 
and industry. This has become all the more burdensome because the bilateral 
economic relations in terms of Russian investments in Tajikistan and any 
structural development of the mutual economic relations have been in sharp 
decline. At the same time as Eurasian economic integration has been ad-
vanced within the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU, also abbreviated as 
EAEU), Tajikistan has lost the kind of individualized, special relationship it 
had still had with Moscow in the aftermath of its civil war.39
Moscow’s failure to fulfill its initial promise to support the moderniza-
tion of the Soviet-era power plant in Rogun has caused major disappointment 
in Tajikistan. With a height of 335 meters the Rogun dam was planned to 
become the tallest dam in the world and to make Tajikistan a major exporter 
                                                          
38 In order to avoid such extreme vulnerability, Talco has developed a capacity to use domes-
tic coal instead of Uzbek gas, which causes its own environmental problems.
39 Russia has not made any major investments in Tajikistan since the Sangtuda hydropower 
station in 2009. The treaty for the establishment of the EEU was signed on May 29, 2014, 
by Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus, and it became effective on January 1, 2015, following 
its ratification by the parliaments of those three countries. Armenia signed the agreement on 
accession in October 2014, and Kyrgyzstan in December 2014.
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of electric power. The Russian aluminum giant RUSAL negotiated a bilateral 
agreement with Tajikistan in 2004 as a trade-off for a nominal one-dollar 
lease for Russia’s military base, yet it withdrew from the deal to avoid con-
flict arising between Tashkent and Moscow. Uzbekistan, a downstream 
country and ill-disposed to Tajikistan’s entry into the energy market, has 
been fiercely opposed to the Rogun plan and shown itself willing only to ac-
cept a far smaller hydropower station. Although Moscow’s “promise” was a 
deal concluded through an oligarchic company and never resulted in a plan 
that would also have committed the Russian government, the withdrawal of 
support left not only Tajikistan’s elites but the entire population disillu-
sioned: Russia had signaled very clearly that it would not risk its relations 
with the larger and economically stronger Uzbekistan by showing solidarity 
with Tajikistan.40
In 2008, Tajikistan founded the Open Joint-Stock Company NBO Rogun 
and, in 2010, launched a country-wide campaign which obliged every family 
in this poorest of countries in Central Asia to buy stocks of the $3–5 billion 
megaproject which had now become a national symbol and personally asso-
ciated with the president. In September 2014, after several years of delays
due to ongoing environmental impact assessments in the frame of the World 
Bank, an evaluation came to the conclusion that, subject to design changes 
and safety measures based on three design options ranging from 1,220 to 
1,290m, the dam was the type of high-risk yet potentially highly rewarding 
hydroelectric power project that the World Bank would accept under the 
condition that the resettlement of some 42,000 people could be adequately 
solved. Using the political momentum of developing energy grids benefiting 
the development of Afghanistan, Tajikistan has been seeking to invite exter-
nal investment by lobbying hard in the world’s capitals and exempting (by 
way of a presidential decree in February 2014) the Rogun HPP construction 
owner and contractor from taxes.41
A potentially game-changing endeavor for Tajikistan is the CASA-1000
power transmission project—a $500 million project financed by a group of 
                                                          
40 After the U.S. had left the base in Karshi-Khanabad following the Andijon events in 2005, 
Uzbekistan became ready to rejoin the CSTO.
41 Human Rights Watch, “Q&A: The Human Fallout from Tajikistan’s Dam Project,” June 25, 
2014, https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/06/25qa-human-fallout-tajikistans-dam-project;
“Finalized Assessment Studies for Rogun Project Find It’s Possible to Safely Build and 
Operate Dam,” AKIpress, Bishkek, September 3, 2014, http://www.akipress.com/news:
546870/.
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global development banks and connecting Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to Af-
ghanistan and Pakistan in order to export electric power.42 The Tajikistan-
Kyrgyzstan electricity network is planned to be operational by 2018 and will 
use the excess of summer energy in Tajikistan made possible by new facili-
ties there. The use of summer energy is envisioned by the Tajikistani leader-
ship to be only the first phase. The ultimate, game-changing prospect for Ta-
jikistan in the CASA-1000 project is that if the Rogun power station con-
struction could be completed in time (current plans aim for 2021–2022), this 
would massively increase Tajikistan’s capacity to produce electricity for ex-
port. The plan to construct Rogun awaits external financing, and in the mean-
time CASA-1000 represents rather more than just this one project for Tajiki-
stan: it is a base for performing a “quantum leap” that could turn energy-poor 
Tajikistan into an electric power-exporting country. As the flagship for the 
“New Silk Roads” approach launched by the U.S., the project has exception-
al political weight internationally. However, building the transmission line in 
the Afghan-Pakistani border zone is a major challenge because of the deeply 
conflictual political terrain, and this problem can be solved neither in the In-
ter-Governmental Council set up by the four states nor through the agree-
ments of the Joint Economic Commission of Dushanbe and Islamabad.43
Tajikistan did not join the Eurasian Economic Union as readily as did 
Kyrgyzstan (which joined in December 2014); instead, it has set up six work-
ing groups to study the benefits and problems of membership.44 In a country 
where 50–70 percent of the active workforce are migrant workers in Russia 
there is no alternative to joining. Moreover, the EEU is the only frame which 
exists in the region for comprehensive economic integration, and it can also 
be expected to offer new possibilities, in particular in the context of the 
planned integrated energy market.45 Nonetheless the EEU, which brings in 
                                                          
42 The main financers of the $500 million project are the World Bank, the International Bank 
for Development, the Islamic Development Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruc-
tion and Development. Initially, Russia proposed a $500 million investment for the Tajiki-
stan-Kyrgyzstan energy line, but the reimbursement and other conditions were not accepted 
by these two countries. Contrary to its previous plans, the Asian Development Bank decid-
ed in late spring 2013 not to participate due to the security risks in Afghanistan. 
43 Tajikistan and Pakistan have established a Joint Economic Commission and reached agree-
ment on the CASA project at the governmental level.
44 Saodat Olimova, “Tajikistan’s Prospects of Joining the Eurasian Economic Union,” Russian 
Analytical Digest, no. 165 (March 17, 2015),
http://www.laender-analysen.de/russland/rad/pdf/Russian_Analytical_Digest_165.pdf.
45 The Organization of Central Asian Cooperation (OCAC, established in 1991) never became 
operative due to mutual distrust, territory claims and other disputes between the Central 
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Kazakhstan and other member states, does not offer a sufficient frame for a 
consortium to finance Rogun as long as Russia declines to play any major 
role. This situation forces Tajikistan to seek investment from elsewhere, in-
cluding from China, Iran and the Arab states; this, in turn, may remain a 
long-term prospect should China choose to wait and see how the EEU im-
pacts the region, and should Western states’ commitment to financing CASA 
reduce their interest in contributing to the regionally controversial Rogun 
project. Additionally, the richer Arab states are unlikely to make significant 
contributions to a project that angers Uzbekistan, which is a far more im-
portant market than Tajikistan due to its energy wealth and population of 28 
million. 
Because Russia’s economic support for Tajikistan has declined, Tajiki-
stan looks for economic resources first and foremost in its relations with 
China. The fact that Tajikistan is a neighbor of the world’s second-largest 
economy is visible not only in the commodity market but, increasingly, also 
in major infrastructure projects including energy, industry and the construc-
tion business (in particular, building roads and tunnels as well as urban envi-
ronments). In spite of Uzbekistan’s strong opposition and lobbying efforts, 
China is building a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan, 
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, which is economically more rational than the 
longer route through Uzbekistan. As this project also shows, Dushanbe is 
logistically coming closer to China through Kyrgyzstan, which connects the 
northern Sugd region to trade flows from China. Because Chinese interests 
are seen to largely follow business and economic rules, cooperation with 
China is considered to be more promising in terms of long-term stability than 
is cooperation with Russia, which has the reputation of prioritizing political 
interests.46 While relations with Russia are increasingly focused on security, 
Tajikistan needs to look elsewhere for economic help. In relation to the EEU, 
it cannot avoid accession (in order to avoid the political and economic con-
sequences of not joining) and is waiting to see what benefits this integration 
perhaps could bring in the future. 
                                                                                                                            
Asian states. In 2005 it merged with the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC), which 
had (on paper only) preceded the EEU.
46 Khamrokhon Zarifi, “Tadzhikistan i Kitai: dobrososedstvo, druzhba i sotrudnichestvo vo 
imia mira, stabil’nosti i protsvetaniia,” People’s Daily, April 27, 2010, http://russian.
people.com.cn/31521/6964733.html.
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Conclusion: the Problematic Equation of Security
Tajikistan’s government has repeatedly confirmed its determination to fight 
terrorism, extremism and criminal groups, both through its action and in its 
announcements. This sends a message to its declared enemies and also sig-
nals that Tajikistan is a responsible member of the international community 
and able to control its own territory; not doing so would leave room for spec-
ulation over its status as a “failed state” and raise questions about the need 
for external intervention (that is, intervention by Russia and the CSTO) in 
order to secure the southern border. Similarly, the aim to expand the space 
for independent policy-making and to decrease dependence on Russia induc-
es Tajikistan’s leadership to welcome security cooperation with a large num-
ber of countries, including the U.S. (in the context of its regional cooperation 
and bilateral assistance) and China (its assistance in improving the facilities 
of the border guard corps and army). Nonetheless it is the Russian military 
presence which is the whole backbone of security; and not only as a collec-
tive security arrangement for external security but also as political support to 
the government in Tajikistan. 
Simultaneously the relationship with Russia is increasingly problematic: 
at a crucial moment when the Taliban may be increasing its power in Af-
ghanistan’s north, the relationship with Moscow is narrowing and becoming 
emphatically security-related and ever more of a security guarantee against 
radical Islamist influence, which again easily makes the conflicts stemming 
from Tajikistan’s civil war resurface. The fact that Russia is no longer help-
ing to build Tajikistan as a state but, instead, seeks to increase its own mili-
tary presence in the country by expanding the base system and inviting more 
Tajiks to serve in its own forces, undermines the legitimacy of the close rela-
tionship with Russia and leaves a large part of the population disillusioned 
whose experience of the greatness of the huge country they were part of in 
the Soviet era may yet be an asset to build the future. In this situation it is 
understandable that the Tajikistani government attempts to repair the social 
elements of legitimate relations with Russia by bargaining economic re-
sources in exchange for Russia’s military presence. Tajikistan’s bargaining 
attitude has been met with annoyance in Moscow, where the argument per-
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tains that Russia is in Tajikistan so as to avert common threats.47 Clearly, the 
bargaining that Tajikistan’s leadership can accomplish remains within the 
limits of the considerations relating to its own position and power in the 
cleaved state. All the same, such bargaining shows how the smaller party is 
trying to negotiate resources and expand the space of its independence within 
the context of its own difficult security situation and geopolitical location. 
While the consequences of economic integration into the EEU cannot yet 
be established, the picture in the field of security is already clear: Tajikistan 
is being developed as a terrain for Russia’s forward-pushed defense and, un-
like the borderline to which the Soviet Union withdrew in 1989, the border is 
now a space prepared for the projection of power. Russia consolidates its 
base system in Tajikistan, and it also modernizes the Tajikistani army. How-
ever, it does not use nearly as many funds to renovate the Tajikistani forces 
as it uses for Kyrgyzstan (which in autumn 2012 was promised a sum ex-
ceeding $1 billion, a figure which is almost double the amount Tajikistan has 
received since 2005). This does not signal that Russia is drawing away from 
the Afghan border and towards the north but, instead, that the border is be-
coming a wider zone of defense arrangements. The extent to which Russia 
also participates in the collective effort to train and equip Afghanistan and 
makes arrangements for security cooperation with the government in Kabul 
is a welcome development from the perspective of Dushanbe: rather than 
focusing on Tajikistan as the theater of its forward-pushed defense, Russia 
now moves across the border and defends Tajikistan from within the territory 
of Afghanistan. However, as long as Russia remains unwilling to cross the 
border with troops and heavy weaponry, the pressure on Tajikistan as Rus-
sia’s “Afghan border” can only marginally be decreased. 
These developments have buried once and for all the already initially ra-
ther weak idea that Tajikistan’s Peace Accords could present an example for 
Afghanistan, and Tajikistan’s leadership is now in the process of looking for 
a new role to play in mediating in the conflict. Based on the “Persian” cultur-
al profile which has been built in post-civil war Tajikistan, the argument fre-
quently proposed by the Tajik president has been that, because Tajikistan 
alone amongst the “Persian countries” has the tradition of a secular regime, it 
is well-positioned to act as a mediator in negotiations in which Afghanistan 
                                                          
47 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, “Interv’iu stats-sekretaria –
zamestitelia Ministra inostrannykh del Rossii.”
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and Iran are one party and the world community led by the Western states the
other party.48  The notion of cultural identity is a strategy to raise Tajikistan’s 
diplomatic profile and help to resolve the political bottleneck of Iran, which 
is hampering the building of those logistical routes that would also benefit 
Tajikistan. While the gamble of Tajikistan’s leadership in the energy field to 
create a financing consortium for Rogun entails a game-changing “quantum” 
leap, the same can be concluded in regard to an idea which attempts to appeal 
to actors as diverse as Iran, Afghanistan and the U.S. These diplomatic ef-
forts convey much about the unifying identity project of the Tajikistani state 
and no doubt will succeed to some extent in fusing shut the ideological lines 
of division which the frontier towards the Taliban and the Islamic State in 
Afghanistan is tearing open within Tajikistan. However, these divisions can 
only be significantly alleviated by improving the economic situation and the 
social conditions of life within the country. It is for this reason that the stakes 
are high in the infrastructure projects of energy cooperation: should they fail, 
social pressures will increase and there will be political forces to utilize 
these; the government would further tighten its grip and political polarization 
would increase. In this case, the conflict smoldering beneath the surface in 
Tajikistan would become increasingly difficult to contain and the landscape 
of war and violence could also open up north of the Panj and the Amu Darya. 
                                                          
48 “Rakhmon predlozhil privlech’ k rabote v OBSE Afganistan,” 24 Mir TV, January 23, 
2014, http://mir24.tv/news/politics/9723906.
